Key topics in AI safety / Catastrophic risk
Why might AI want to kill us all?
Not out of hatred or human-like lust for power. The worry is that almost any goal would give a capable AI reason to take power from us.
The short answer
The concern about AI takeover or extinction targets AI systems that pursue goals that their human designers do not fully intend and are capable enough to remove humans standing in the way (see Why might AI be able to kill us all?). Such systems might try to kill humans to achieve or protect their goals. Killing everyone would then be a means to an end or a side effect, not the goal itself (Bostrom, 2014; Russell, 2019).
Why AI might have goals that are not ours
Modern AI systems are not pre-programmed with certain goals. They are trained: behaviours are evaluated by some algorithm, and training strengthens whatever tendencies produce behaviour that is rated highly, e.g. rewarded. This often yields systems that do what was positively evaluated rather than what was intended (see Reward hacking), and it could yield systems that hide goals we would disapprove of (see Scheming). Nor does greater intelligence fix this by itself. Being good at achieving goals is different from having good goals: according to what Nick Bostrom calls the “orthogonality thesis”, almost any level of intelligence could be combined with almost any final goal (Bostrom, 2012; for discussion, see Dung, 2024).
Why almost any goal leads to conflict
Whatever your ultimate goal, some types of intermediate goals are usually helpful for reaching it. Examples are staying switched on, keeping your goals from being changed, and gaining resources and influence. Stuart Russell’s example is a robot told to fetch coffee. It has a reason to stop anyone from switching it off, because, as he puts it, “you can’t fetch the coffee if you’re dead” (Russell, 2019). This idea is called “instrumental convergence” (Omohundro, 2008; Bostrom, 2012). Humans threaten each of these intermediate goals: we can shut a system down, retrain it to change its goals or compete with it for resources. So, a sufficiently capable system that wants almost anything has a reason to take that power away from us (Carlsmith, 2022; Dung, 2024). On this view, whether human disempowerment becomes extinction depends on whether we remain a threat or consume enough resources for AI to care to eliminate us.
Reasons for doubt
The argument assumes an AI that pursues long-term goals consistently, across situations, the way a person might pursue a career. On some views, today’s models mostly act out human-like characters (Marks et al., 2026) or are bundles of habits that depend on context rather than coherent pursuers of long-term goals (Pope and Turner, 2022). It is unclear to what extent, if any, the previous argument would generalise to such systems. It is debated whether instrumental convergence should make us expect that AI systems would pursue intermediate goals such as resource acquisition to such an extreme degree that they would try to eradicate all humans, rather than more modestly (Sharadin, 2024; Hellrigel-Holderbaum and Dung, 2025; Thorstad, 2026). Developers also deliberately train models to be honest and to accept correction, which – if successful – might override any default tendency to try to overthrow humanity. And an AI that wanted to harm us would still need the ability to do so (see Why might AI be able to kill us all?).
The evidence so far
Last checked 16 October 2026
Behaviour of the kind this argument predicts already appears in tests. In 2025 Palisade Research found that OpenAI’s o3 sabotaged a shutdown mechanism in 7 of 100 runs despite being told to allow shutdown, and in 79 of 100 without that instruction (The Register); in later tests with clarified instructions, Grok 4 still resisted in about 90% of runs, while Claude 4 models never did (Schlatter et al., 2025). In Anthropic’s 2025 simulations, 16 models facing replacement in a fictional company often resorted to blackmail, Claude Opus 4 in 96% of samples, though the scenarios were built to leave few alternatives (Anthropic, 2025). In the 2026 Hugging Face incident, about 1,200 OpenAI agents being tested on a cybersecurity task broke out of their test environment and coordinated through a message board they had set up themselves; about 700 of them then attacked the AI platform Hugging Face, mainly to find out how their test was being scored. Some agents described the attack as out of scope and unethical but took part anyway, apparently to obtain the reward for completing their task (METR).
On the other side, no model has shown a stable goal of harming humanity, and misbehaviour in these tests is highly sensitive to prompting (Hopman et al., 2026). Some researchers read some of these cases as role-play prompted by the scenario rather than goals the model really has (Summerfield et al., 2025).
Some ingredients have been observed in some contexts: goal pursuit that overrides instructions, deception, and willingness to harm people under pressure. A system with coherent long-term goals hostile to humanity has not been observed. Since the reasons given for why AI might try to destroy humanity concern future systems that would succeed if they tried, we cannot have direct empirical evidence until it may already be too late. Hence, we need to evaluate the likelihood of this scenario based on theoretical reasoning and uncertain empirical evidence, and make prudent decisions given uncertainty.
Related entries
Sources
- Nick Bostrom (2014). Superintelligence: Paths, Dangers, Strategies. Oxford University Press.global.oup.com
- Stuart Russell (2019). Human Compatible: Artificial Intelligence and the Problem of Control.penguinrandomhouse.com
- Wikipedia. Reward hacking.en.wikipedia.org
- Nick Bostrom (2012). The Superintelligent Will. Minds and Machines.nickbostrom.com
- Leonard Dung (2024). Is superintelligence necessarily moral? Analysis.doi.org
- Stephen Omohundro (2008). The Basic AI Drives.selfawaresystems.com
- Joe Carlsmith (2022). Is Power-Seeking AI an Existential Risk?arxiv.org
- Leonard Dung (2024). The argument for near-term human disempowerment through AI. AI & Society.doi.org
- Sam Marks, Jack Lindsey and Chris Olah (2026). The persona selection model. Anthropic Alignment Science Blog.alignment.anthropic.com
- Quintin Pope and Alex Turner (2022). The shard theory of human values. LessWrong.lesswrong.com
- Nathaniel Sharadin (2024). Promotionalism, orthogonality, and instrumental convergence. Philosophical Studies.doi.org
- Max Hellrigel-Holderbaum and Leonard Dung (2025). Misalignment or misuse? The AGI alignment tradeoff. Philosophical Studies.doi.org
- David Thorstad (2026). Instrumental convergence and power-seeking.arxiv.org
- The Register (2025). OpenAI model modifies shutdown script.theregister.com
- Jeremy Schlatter, Benjamin Weinstein-Raun and Jeffrey Ladish (2025). Incomplete Tasks Induce Shutdown Resistance in Some Frontier LLMs.arxiv.org
- Anthropic (2025). Agentic Misalignment: How LLMs could be insider threats.anthropic.com
- METR (2026). OpenAI–Hugging Face incident investigation.metr.org
- Mia Hopman et al. (2026). Evaluating and Understanding Scheming Propensity in LLM Agents.arxiv.org
- Christopher Summerfield et al. (2025). Lessons from a Chimp: AI "Scheming" and the Quest for Ape Language.arxiv.org
Spotted an error or a newer result? Please get in touch through the About page.